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Dear Professor Ogborn, 
 
Please find attached our revised article in light of the referees’ comments. We would 
like to thank all three referees for the extremely useful comments they provided. We 
have tried to address them, and this letter details the changes we made to the paper. 
 
A common concern among the referees had to do with the status of technology and 
understanding more about technological change through our empirical example. Ref-1 
suggested that we engage with some of the related literature. We have done this, and 
now the paper has more general messages to deliver rather than remaining limited to 
a description of pneumatic technologies. These have to do with the merits of not 
limiting analysis to mere technological aspects, and the usefulness of taking into 
consideration auxiliarytechnologies which might end up in ‘failure’ – rather than 
focusing on innovation and success only. 
 
Addressing this issue also helped us to clarify our approach, which was highlighted by 
Ref-3. We are now clear that our analysis is not undermined by technological 
determinism, that we consider cultural aspects as well, and more sensitive to the 
broader context (which were also highlighted by Ref 1 and 2). 
 
The major change followed from this position: that the disappearance of pneumatic 
networks had to do not merely with technological limitations and rapid urban change, 
but also withdominant urban imaginaries about urban modernity, and concerns about 
giving access to underground. The list of references on urban modernities provided by 
Ref-1 was very helpful in developing these aspects of the article. Also, the point made 
by Ref-2 about the representations of this technology led us to a film by Truffaut, 
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which we have used to illustrate our point about the place of pneumatic networks in 
the imaginary. We have also greatly benefited from the formulations of Ref-1 and Ref-
2 on (in)visibility and benign neglect, and of Ref-3’s recommendation to consider these 
networks in relation to urban modernities. 
 
Ref-3’s comments also encouraged us to signal these arguments early on in the paper, 
and develop especially the first and the last sections. 
 
We brought in an article by Atmore (2004) to make one of our points more clear: that 
these technologies were at the time a real alternative. Retrospectively, they do not 
seem to make much sense, given the limitations, but in the nineteenth-century this 
was not yet definitive. 
 
We realised also that we had introduced some confusion regarding London and Paris. 
The difference is not, as Ref-1 pointed out, only down to private versus public 
organizational structure. We are now more clear on this (e.g. Paris system benefited 
largely from the existence of vaulted sewers and a more compact urban pattern). 
 
We hope that these changes are satisfactory. We are grateful for the very constructive 




Prof. Mustafa Dikeç (corresponding author) 
and 




We would like to thank all three referees for the extremely useful comments they 
provided. We have tried to address them, and this letter details the changes we made 
to the paper. 
 
A common concern among the referees had to do with the status of technology and 
understanding more about technological change through our empirical example. Ref-1 
suggested that we engage with some of the related literature. We have done this, and 
now the paper has more general messages to deliver rather than remaining limited to 
a description of pneumatic technologies. These have to do with the merits of not 
limiting analysis to mere technological aspects, and the usefulness of taking into 
consideration auxiliarytechnologies which might end up in ‘failure’ – rather than 
focusing on innovation and success only. 
 
Addressing this issue also helped us to clarify our approach, which was highlighted by 
Ref-3. We are now clear that our analysis is not undermined by technological 
determinism, that we consider cultural aspects as well, and more sensitive to the 
broader context (which were also highlighted by Ref 1 and 2). 
 
The major change followed from this position: that the disappearance of pneumatic 
networks had to do not merely with technological limitations and rapid urban change, 
but also withdominant urban imaginaries about urban modernity, and concerns about 
giving access to underground. The list of references on urban modernities provided by 
Ref-1 was very helpful in developing these aspects of the article. Also, the point made 
by Ref-2 about the representations of this technology led us to a film by Truffaut, 
which we have used to illustrate our point about the place of pneumatic networks in 
the imaginary. We have also greatly benefited from the formulations of Ref-1 and Ref-
2 on (in)visibility and benign neglect, and of Ref-3’s recommendation to consider these 
networks in relation to urban modernities. 
 
Ref-3’s comments also encouraged us to signal these arguments early on in the paper, 
*Revision Notes
 2 
and develop especially the first and the last sections. 
 
We brought in an article by Atmore (2004) to make one of our points more clear: that 
these technologies were at the time a real alternative. Retrospectively, they do not 
seem to make much sense, given the limitations, but in the nineteenth-century this 
was not yet definitive. 
 
We realised also that we had introduced some confusion regarding London and Paris. 
The difference is not, as Ref-1 pointed out, only down to private versus public 
organizational structure. We are now more clear on this (e.g. Paris system benefited 
largely from the existence of vaulted sewers and a more compact urban pattern). 
 
We hope that these changes are satisfactory. We are grateful for the very constructive 
remarks and suggestions. 
 
‘The Modern Atlas’: 
Compressed air and nineteenth-century cities 
 
Acknowledgements: The research on which this paper is based is part of the project ‘Pumping 
time: geographies of temporal infrastructures in fin de siècle Paris’, funded by the Arts and 
Humanities Research Council (grant number AH/H39414/1). We gratefully acknowledge this 
support. We are also grateful to the three referees and to Jonathan Rutherford for their 
constructive comments and suggestions. 
 
Corresponding author: 
Prof. Mustafa Dikeç 
Institutional affiliation : 




Mailing address : 
Professor Mustafa Dikec 
LATTS 
6 avenue Blaise Pascal 




Dr Carlos Lopez Galviz 







*Title page with author details
 Highlights for ‘The Modern Atlas’: 
 
 Pneumatic technologies were significant parts of nineteenth-century 
Western cities 
 Compressed air competed with electricity as motor power 




‘The Modern Atlas’ 
 
Abstract: This article provides an overview of pneumatic technologies in nineteenth- 
and early twentieth-century Western cities. As urban centres continued to grow and 
expand in the nineteenth century, networks of compressed air were introduced to 
provide public utilities and private services in a variety of domains, ranging from postal 
services to beauty parlours. Previously used in mining and large construction works, 
pneumatic technologies seemed to rival electricity towards the end of nineteenth-
century in the provision of urban utilities. In the end, however, these technologies did 
not prove flexible enough to keep up with rapid urban growth and expansion, nor 
were they able to become glorious symbols of urban modernity. Through an overview 
of compressed air applications as used in urban centres, our article provides an insight 
into the relationship between technological networks and urban modernities from the 
perspective of this relatively neglected urban network and technology. 
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‘The Modern Atlas’: 
Compressed air and nineteenth-century cities 
 
 
Compressed air, though as old as the hills, is a new thing in its 
usefulness to mankind. This century, and we may also say this 
decade, is the compressed air era, and yet the useful application 
of this power has become so general, that we appear to be only 
beginning to enter this wide field of usefulness.1 
 
 
Pipe dreams  
 
In 1900, Charles Emory Smith, the then postmaster-general of the United States, 
predicted that by the end of the decade the pneumatic postal tube system would 
extend to every house for the immediate delivery of mail following its arrival in cities.2 
It turned out that his prediction was not quite accurate – far from it. By 1918, it 
became clear that the future of mail delivery in the USA did not lie in pneumatic tubes, 
and the system was gradually suspended in the following years. Smith’s prediction, 
however, was not so much off the mark either. In the late nineteenth and early 
twentieth century, the use of such networks in cities of Western Europe and the 
United States was hardly uncommon. Pneumatic technologies were perceived as a 
developing and promising technology for the future. It was, contemporaries observed, 
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‘The Age of Compressed Air’. Compressed air was ‘The Modern Atlas’ that sustained 
the industrial world upon which one ‘revelled in dreams of pneumatic enthusiasm’.3 
 
Insert Figs 1 and 2 here 
 
The glory days may be over, but pneumatic technologies are far from dead. Several 
small cities in France opt for pneumatic recycling systems in newly built areas (Saint 
Ouen, Romainville). There are also signs that some of the dreams of the pneumatic 
enthusiasts may be materializing. Since 2003, a system called Pipenet has been 
developing to propose a more environmentally friendly and cheaper alternative to 
freight transport.4 In 2013, the French car manufacturer Peugeot revealed its new 
hybrid engine using fuel and compressed air, which is expected to reduce fuel 
consumption and be ready for commercialisation by 2016. The MDI (Motor 
Development International), another French Company, has been developing 
compressed air cars for more than two decades, and has recently signed a licence 
agreement with the Indian automotive manufacturing company Tata Motors to 
produce and commercialise compressed air cars in India, notably its AirPod model.5 
Hybrid technologies constitute one of the key alternatives that car manufacturers 
continue to explore in order to preserve their share in the future of sustainable 
mobilities.   
 
In this article, we explore the contribution that a brief survey of pneumatic 
technologies in nineteenth- and twentieth-century Western cities has to make to our 
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understanding of the consolidation of urban networks. Whereas transport, 
telecommunications, electricity, sewers, and, more recently, water have received due 
attention by historical geographers, historians of science and technology as well as 
cultural historians, scholarship on compressed air has been predominantly the field of 
practitioners and enthusiasts, who highlight the minutiae often to the expense of 
context and analysis.6 One of our aims is to contribute to redressing this balance 
through a close examination of pneumatic technologies that traces their emergence, 
development and final disappearance. In so doing, we wish to explore whether and 
how the ‘cities of air’ might supplement the better-known ‘cities of light’, with Paris 
being the most iconic example. As the article will show, Paris and other cities were 
cities of air too, where pneumatic systems compressed, distributed and sold air in a 
way analogous to public utilities. Furthermore, pneumatic technologies contributed to 
and were part of the specialisation of uses that was characteristic of the proliferation 
of urban networks. A detailed characterisation of that process in European and North 
American cities will provide unique insights into the relationship between 
technological networks and urban modernities. 
 
Technological networks and urban modernities 
 
The rise of the telegraph, and later telephony, developments in postal services and 
urban transport, the planning and construction of sewers as well as the provision of 
public utilities such as gas and water have been central to studying the development of 
networks of infrastructure in cities.7 Urban networks were, and remain, visible and 
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invisible; overground and underground; fixed yet growing; privately-funded and 
publicly-operated or a combination of both; giving comfort to city dwellers, but also 
making them vulnerable.8 One of the significant aspects of the planning, building and 
maintaining of these networks lies in their being an expression of and a means for the 
modernisation of cities, a process that is gradual and piecemeal, juxtaposing new and 
old.  
 
As Richard Dennis argues, modernisation involves a ‘marriage of technology and myth-
making’ in the sense that ideas around transport infrastructure, for example, often 
draw on notions such as progress and improvement.9  True, the emergence of 
tramways, the wide-spread use of bicycles and, gradually since the opening of the 
Metropolitan Railway in London in 1863, underground railways, did transform the 
urban experience of nineteenth-century cities, but an important part of that 
experience included the vast majority of people that continued to walk, negotiating 
their way amidst horses, animals, carts and other vehicles in generally overcrowded 
streets and thoroughfares.10  
 
Change also involved regulation, whether this was in the form of directing public 
behaviour on streets and markets, encouraging co-ordination in the provision of public 
utilities that were often built by private companies, and developing the regulatory 
frameworks to support the effective governance of infrastructure.11 Building networks 
was supplemented by building upwards, following important innovations in steel-
frame structures and hydraulic lifts, both central to the now familiar skyline of cities 
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such as Chicago, Boston or New York. Moreover, cities became places where the pace 
of change seemed to accelerate and technological innovation thrived as it has been 
explored in the ‘urban histories of technology’ by Mendelshon, and others.12 
 
The modernisation of cities, the building of new networks and the upgrading, 
maintenance, reuse or closure of old infrastructure are all part of the same process. As 
Graham and Marvin suggest: 'Networked infrastructure *…+ provides the technological 
links that make the very notion of a modern city possible.'13 Modern cities, in the late 
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, provided the quintessential arena for the 
consolidation of these networks. Technologies undergird the transformation of cities, 
but so do cities structure the conditions under which technological innovation and 
development might evolve.  
 
‘To think in terms of networks’, Osterhammel argued, ‘was a nineteenth-century 
development’.14 Following the work of Matthew Gandy, we relate the ‘modernisation’ 
of cities in nineteenth century to the development of technological networks. 
Pneumatics was a network-creating technology, and was thus associated with what we 
call urban modernities, which we see as a ‘technopolitical field’ that includes ideas 
about and images of the city.15 The importance of imaginary in shaping socio-spatial 
configuration in cities has been noted by several scholars.16 Urban modernity in the 
nineteenth and into the twentieth century was closely associated with advances in 
science and technology, which found a prominent place in cityscapes. As Kaika and 
Swyngedouw argue, during this period of modernisation, urban networks were 
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celebrated as glorious symbols of modernity and were proudly displayed in urban 
spaces. After the war, however, they started losing their place in cityscapes and came 
to be seen as a mere engineering matter best kept out of sight. This shift from being 
civic symbols of modernity to engineering problems led to their disappearance not 
only from cityscapes but also from urban imaginaries.17 
 
In the case of sociotechnicial transition, Elizabeth Shove argues that the focus is for the 
most part on the introduction of new technologies, and how this implies the death or 
demise of other networks.18 Our story is not one about a new technology replacing the 
old. It takes place in a period of experimentation with different technologies in an age 
fascinated by technological innovations and networks,19 where several technologies – 
electric, pneumatic, gas – that were competing with each other. Pneumatic 
technologies deployed in urban space captured the imagination of inhabitants, in Paris 
in particular. However, their shortcomings undermined confidence in them in the early 
periods of experimentation, and they did not have the same versatility and ‘visibility’ 
as electricity. The pneumatic pipes were relegated to the underground where they did 
useful work, while electricity lit up the streets (gas as well but this is not covered in this 
article), giving it, as it were, a more prominent display and place in the urban 
landscape and imaginary. Perhaps exemplary here is a scene in François Truffaut’s 
1968 film Stolen Kisses, one of the later representations of this technology in film 
where the camera follows the rusted pipes in the dark sewers while a canister with a 
letter in it travels through them – very convenient network, but not a particularly 
glorious image. Partly because of its relative safety and ‘invisibility’, compressed air 
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was not as fascinating as electricity or gas, and was therefore more susceptible to 
benign neglect.20 There is also evidence from Paris that suggests that electricity was 
seen somewhat more ‘scientific’, an example of which was the Paris Observatory 
scientists’ preference of electricity over pneumatics for the regulation of the city’s 
clocks. 
 
By examining the introduction of compressed air into the fabric of late nineteenth and 
early twentieth-century cities we can characterise the relationship between 
technological change and urban growth. New technologies required a market to 
succeed. That market was, in cities, plural, generally open and ‘splintered’ in a wide 
range of uses and applications. It was in cities that electricity, for example, generated 
and built upon a significant market of hotels, shops, theatres, fashionable restaurants 
and middle-class households, which used the new technology to lure their customers 
and users into a new sense of being modern. By contrast, compressed air was a 
technology whose applications tended to be niche, limited to specialist services such 
as the post and time regulation.  
 
The inroads that the advocates and businessmen behind compressed air carved were 
modest by comparison with electricity. The scale of the plans and the actual 
infrastructure that they built were not based upon the ‘culture of invention’, which 
might have been apparent through the experience of AIG in Berlin, or that of Thomas 
A. Edison in Menlo Park. Nor did compressed air create a system combining invention 
and science, on the one hand, and manufacturing and distribution, on the other – at 
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least not during the period considered here and certainly not in a way that would 
make it comparable to contemporary developments in electricity. Pneumatic tubes 
were not the stuff behind ambitious schemes such as ‘Superpower’, northeast of the 
United States, which ‘called for the construction of privately funded Superpower 
plants of 60,000-to-300,000-kilowatt capacity to be interconnected by transmission 
lines of 110,000 to 220,000 volts’; or, Gifford Pinchot’s giant plant in western 
Pennsylvania with a similar output and 200 miles to cover; or, Henry Ford’s 
increasingly decentralizing model, started along the Rouge River in his Dearborn farm, 
soon expanding with ‘assembly branches in ten countries and assembly or service 
branches in thirty-four American cities’ by the mid 1920s.21 Furthermore, the role that 
patents and intellectual property played in the legal and commercial applications of 
electricity has no equivalent in compressed air, or, at any rate, none that we have seen 
in the period covered in this article.22   
 
When seen through the lens of compressed air, the technological change that we 
might associate with steam or electricity and its relationship to cities looks different. It 
reveals what contribution supplementary and auxiliary technologies made to the 
modernisation of cities, stressing the conditions under which technological innovation 
and development might evolve in contexts that are specifically urban. Developments in 
compressed air during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries were part of the larger 
process of differentiation, consolidation and transition of technological networks in 
cities. This is a process that we know well in relation to water, sewers, electricity, 
transport, postal services, and more, but not in relation to supplementary technologies 
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such as compressed air. This focus seems to us important in two respects. First, it gives 
technological change a spatial dimension in a way that echoes the location and places 
of knowledge that Ophir, Shapin and Schaffer have foregrounded in science.23 The 
introduction of compressed air in cities contributed to forging a new geography of 
networks that connected (and, therefore, also separated) specific places such as 
hotels, banks, railway stations, and post offices across cities as diverse as London, 
Paris, Boston, Chicago, New York, Berlin, Vienna and Prague; and it did so differently, 
but also with some similarities between cities. Second, the focus on compressed air 
highlights the joining of the twin forces of diversifying and specialisation. In other 
words, compressed air was suitable for some but not all of the small-scale industries 
and businesses that had a foothold in cities. It represented advantages, notably its 
safety, its cleanliness, and its ease of operation and maintenance which made skilled 
labour redundant, thus saving costs. Among the limitations there were the capital 
needed to meet the costs of first installation and the comparatively high rate of power 
loss when the air compressed was transmitted at a distance. 
 
In addition to providing a survey of these neglected pneumatic technologies in cities, 
our aim is to show what the development of supplementary and auxiliary technologies 
reveals about the larger process of modernisation in cities. The ‘rise’ and ‘fall’ of 
compressed air resonates with the significant role that urban populations and urban 
commerce have had in the shaping of technologies in European cities, as shown by 
Hård, Misa and others.24 Concentration and density were important factors in the 
geography of compressed air; in how compressed air was produced and distributed; 
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and in who were the ‘air’ customers whether in the bourgeois residences and small 
workshops and businesses of cities like London and Paris or in the tall buildings of 
Chicago and New York. Pneumatic networks produced ‘cities of air’ that stood side by 
side with the better-known cities of light, not least in Paris. Safety and hygiene, 
adaptability to the scarcity of space that was (and still is) characteristic of cities, and 
being a relief to overcrowded services supported by other technologies, are all part of 
the story that tells us exactly how and where air met light. 
 
The precise ways in which pneumatic technologies were introduced into nineteenth-
century European and North American cities will show the extent to which compressed 
air, very much in line with other technologies, supported and contributed to the 
specialisation of a wide range of services each based upon specific needs. To a degree 
the developments that are examined in this article show technology as contingent 
‘born out of conflict, difference *and+ resistance’, and as being permeated by strategies 
in which actors and contexts ‘are recursively implicated’. 25  The production of 
compressed air required the construction of large buildings to house large machinery, 
from which an intricate network of pipes, valves and regulators originated, connecting 
homes, public buildings and other places to an operational system. The social edifice of 
modern lives founded on regularity, reliability and comfort was based upon this kind of 
infrastructure. In some respects, the buildings where compressed air was produced 
embody the dialectical relationship between the invisibility of infrastructure and the 
monumentality that is at the heart of urban networks.26 
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The cities where compressed air was used, in this article limited to Europe and North 
America, determined the kind and scope of the pneumatic systems that were built. 
Questions around efficiency and productivity as well as safety, ease of use and 
maintenance took on a different dimension in cities. Using compressed air in, for 
example, mines or in large infrastructure projects like bridges represented 
unquestionable benefits, but the question remained as to whether and how those 
benefits translated into urban contexts. At the same time, plants, pumps, tubes and 
reservoirs provided a most welcome relief to the intensification of communications, 
notably, postal services and urban transport, in cities. However, although pneumatic 
technologies proved useful in mines and large infrastructure projects, as well as in the 
earlier stages of the expansion of urban communication networks, they could not 
match the dynamism of urban growth. As we will see later on in the article, expanding 
them to match urban growth was both economically and technically demanding – not 
impossible technologically, but technology was one aspect of the problem. Pneumatic 
technologies also did not have the same versatility and especially visibility as their 
main competitor, electricity, and did not become prominent symbols of urban 
modernities. Before moving on to the technical details of such systems, however, let 
us first get a sense of the origins of compressed air technologies. 
 
Pumps, tubes and reservoirs: origins and uses of compressed air 
 
The uses and applications of compressed air have a long history. From diving bells to 
early submarines, including Bushnell’s designs during the American war of 
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independence, through to ancient pumps, pneumatic engines for mining and the air-
pump controversy between Thomas Hobbes and Robert Boyle, the history of 
compressed air has been both ubiquitous and overlooked.27  
 
Among the earliest uses of compressed air we find the ‘air treading bags, the wooden 
cylinder and piston, and the Chinese wind-box’, which, according to a contemporary 
account, were still prevalent in China, India, Burma, Borneo and Madagascar at the 
turn of the 20th century. Compressed air and hydraulic pumps were prominent in the 
intricate and often extraordinary mechanisms that Egyptians used in their temples. 
Other applications and experiments included Ctesibius’s wind guns in Alexandria 
around 120 BC, perfected over fifteen centuries later through the pneumatic gun by 
Marin in France and Guter in Nuremberg, both in the seventeenth century; Otto van 
Guericke’s compressed-air and vacuum pump; Denys Papin’s experiments with ‘an air 
pump driven by a water wheel’ that was to allow motive power to be transmitted at a 
distance; ‘the pneumatic pumping engine at the mines of Chemnitz, in Hungary, 
erected by M. Hoell in 1755’; the rather simple, elegant and successful experiment 
with air pumps connected to air bags, which allowed the recovery of sunken vessels by 
Professor St Clair, in Edinburgh in 1785; Medhurst’s pneumatic tube system for the 
conveyance of people and parcels patented in England in 1810, discussed below; 
Baron von Rathlen’s compressed-air vehicle, reported to have reached 12 miles per 
hour in 1848; John Gorrie’s USA patent from 1851, which provided the basis for the 
use of compressed air in refrigeration, instrumental in the transport of food and other 
perishables a few decades later; postal services, first in London and soon after in use 
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across main cities in Europe and the United States; compressed-air locomotives and 
cars for mining but also for urban transport; and a broad range of equipment for the 
construction industries, both structural and ornamental, as well as specialist tools 
whose applications ranged from medical instruments to artist’s tools and domestic 
cleaning.28 
 
At the turn of the 19th century, advocates of pneumatic technologies considered 
compressed air to be a sound alternative when contrasted with steam-operated 
machinery, and, later on, as a firm competitor against the luring appeal of electricity. A 
key difficulty was securing the capital, which was deemed too high when the initial 
investment in machinery and infrastructure and the prospective returns were 
compared. George Medhurst’s ‘invention of machinery for the rapid conveyance of 
goods and passengers by air’ in Britain is an early example of that trend. His 1810 
patent suggests that Medhurst had two systems in mind: one for light parcels and 
letters and another for heavier loads. Both posed different challenges and involved 
different kinds of infrastructure. At the same time, they both provided an alternative 
to existing means of transport, that is, roads and canals, particularly in relation to the 
labour needed in their operation and the constant disruptions to their services caused 
by frost, wind and rain. 
 
'By forcing the air through the tube with a pressure of three ounces per square inch for 
every ounce weight in motion', a packet of letters, say, could be transported at up to 
one hundred miles per hour. The key was for the tubes to be of a uniform dimension 
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and be laid avoiding sudden curvatures. Part of the system were the 'air-tight rooms’ 
distributed along the tube network. This is where the letters and parcels would be 
propelled to from their places of origin reaching their final destination in stages 
through a succession of these rooms. 'If', on the other hand, Medhurst wrote, 
 
A tube or tunnel is built of brick, stone, timber or iron, of twelve feet area, upon 
or under ground from one place to another in a line as straight as the surface of 
the country will permit; and a four-wheeled carriage is fitted to run within it 
upon an iron road, so that no considerable quantity of air can escape between 
the sides, such carriage loaded with one ton weight of goods, and weighting 
itself ten hundred, will be impelled upon level ground with the velocity of 20 
miles per hour by a pressure of air against it of 220lb. which is two ounces per 
square inch.29 
 
In other words, it was the rapid, certain and reliable transport of goods that required 
new infrastructure. Interestingly, the system combining a 12-feet tube, a wheeled 
carriage and an iron road uses the very same principle (and dimensions) of the system 
built by the Pneumatic Dispatch Company in London, which we discuss below. Perhaps 
more importantly, Medhurst’s method provided the foundation for Peter Barlow’s 
‘subway omnibus system’ (1869) whose infrastructure was perfected by James 
Greathead, and upon which the City and South London (1890), and later Tube lines 
were built. 30  Incorporating a new technology of traction, namely electricity, 
Medhurst’s ideas for the transport of light goods and parcels would become the very 
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basis for the infrastructure moving millions of passengers across London in the twenty-
first century.31  
 
Medhurst was a mechanical engineer and clockmaker apprentice (in Clerkenwell, 
London). His Calculations and pamphlets – three that we know of from 1810, 1812 and 
1827 – contributed to a body of work that later authors could build on, leading to 
experiments such as the successful demonstration in Southwark, London, of the 
Samuda Brother's first atmospheric railway in 1839, the very fundaments of which 
followed Medhurst’s principles. Part of redressing the balance in the historiography of 
compressed air lies precisely in highlighting the kind of precedent that Medhurst’s 
work provided for future transport in London which, incidentally, enables us to move 
beyond his rather misleading characterisation as ‘an obscure London instrument-
maker’.32 
 
Insert Fig. 3 here 
 
Similar in conception and scope to Medhurst’s ideas was John Vallance’s pneumatic 
system, which proposed to use a cylinder for the conveyance of goods, largely coal, in 
South East England. Despite the local support after the successful trial of a scale 
model, the system was never built. As Vallance explained in his response to criticisms: 
‘the experience we have as to conveying both water and gas through pipes, proves 
that we certainly may send common air through a tube or tunnel extending from 
Brighton to Shoreham Harbour.’33 According to Vallance, facilities of communication 
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might become public utilities, something that was particularly important in cities. After 
all, the transport of heavy goods such as coal, but also of letters, parcels and people, 
included higher frequencies, larger loads, often requiring speedier deliveries, where 
more people lived and worked. A key question was refining the needs that might 
shape a promising market vis-à-vis securing the investment to finance the building of a 
pneumatic system. How to ensure that the air compressed would travel long distances 
without loss of power and capacity was central to the process.  
 
Late in the 1830s, French engineer Andraud conducted a series of experiments with 
the aim of using compressed air as a motive force that could be stored and transmitted 
remotely.34 Andraud tested his ideas with a railway car in Chaillot, France, in 1840, 
which, a contemporary rapporteur commented, achieved little by way of its potential 
widespread use. The rapporteur, A. Pernolet, was an engineer versed in the theories 
developed in German, English and American publications, who also visited key sites 
including the collieries of Wales, Lancashire, the Newcastle Basin, the royal mines of 
Saarbruck, in the Ruhr Basin of Austria and Belgium, and the tunnels of Mont Cenis and 
Saint-Gothard. In Pernolet’s view, the experiments of another engineer, Triger, in the 
mines of Chalonnes in 1845 constituted the first successful practical application of 
compressed air for producing motive power remotely.35 Moreover, compressed air 
was 'the only agent of transmission that could be kept separate from the motive 
power it transmit[ted]', allowing the storing of part of the power produced, so that it 
could be released in fractions and at intervals by using regulating valves. The 
economics seemed also favourable. Pernolet estimated that the cost of producing 20 
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horse-power by steam employing 200 men was 54 francs per day. By contrast, one 
person’s labour using compressed air would produce the same 20 horse-power at 0.27 
francs for 12 hrs or 0.22 francs per day.36 Rationalisation of labour involved making the 
work of men more efficient, but also redundant. 
 
Efficiency in terms of energy and capacity transmission was important and often 
explained by reference to four agents: steam, electricity, water, and air (compressed 
or rarefied).37 Steam had dominated for more than a century. It did not cost much, but 
it was not very efficient especially if it had to be transmitted over a distance, which 
tended to restrict its application to urban networks. Steam was not a very handy 
technology for use in galleries either, nor for portable tools, and was difficult to 
maintain. Hydraulic machines that used pressurized water had much better efficiency, 
but this method, like steam, did not work well with portable tools. Freezing was a 
problem, so was the high cost of initial installation. Electricity seemed like the most 
convenient system, but it required specialized personnel, which made its use on 
construction sites less practical. Electricity could not be used in mines because of the 
difficulty of mounting the necessary equipment in galleries and the risk of explosion, 
nor for powering machines; or in manufacturing or distribution sites with inflammable 
and explosive materials. By contrast, there were no steam, water or cables on site 
when compressed air was used; the diameter of tubes and pipes was reduced; no heat 
was caused by steam, nor seepage observed in water mains. The combination of these 




As important was the location where applications of compressed air would take hold, 
whether it was in remote and inaccessible mountain sites or in the immediate vicinity 
of cities where other technologies might provide a sound alternative. For later 
commentators, from early on compressed air was ‘used for mining and tunnelling, for 
which no other power was available, and in fact in all the early uses of compressed air 
it was only used where it was considered a necessity regardless of expense, it having 
always been termed an expensive power’.38 As another observer put it: 
 
To those familiar with compressed-air practice in the United States, it would 
seem that the possible economies and the best efficiencies have been worked 
out and adopted quite slowly, if not almost with reluctance. And yet the period 
covered from the beginning of the modern, and now general, employment of 
compressed air for power and other purposes is not much more than a quarter 
of a century. It was adopted at first upon compulsion and not by choice. For the 
driving of rock drills in tunnels and mines there was no other means in sight, and 
its employment became imperative also for resisting the inflow of water where 
men were employed below water level, for example in the sinking of caissons for 
bridge piers and other foundations.39 
 
The pace of inventions and improvements on existing technologies ran parallel, often 
intersecting with, the specialisation and spatialitation of uses, industrial, domestic and 
otherwise. Moreover, the successful application of compressed air was somewhat a 
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compromise between costs and efficiency, on the one hand, and the limitations of 
existing technologies, on the other. Specialisation followed from this, so that, at least 
three types of infrastructure used compressed air by the third quarter of the 
nineteenth century: tunnels, underwater works and foundations by deep poles for 
bridges, particularly in unstable land. By the 1880s in France, for example, confidence 
had grown among engineers about the use of compressed air in the sinking of caissons 
and the foundations of bridges,40 a trend that was repeated years later in the USA, as 
the commentary above explained. One of the most prominent and iconic examples of 
the use of compressed air were the foundations of the Eiffel Tower. 
 
Insert Fig. 4 here  
 
National prestige also became a factor determining the kind of developments in 
pneumatic technologies. A French commentator even claimed that compressed air was 
the only technology that would allow France to compete effectively in an international 
context, specifically with Britain and Prussia.41 A vote of confidence was the teaching 
of compressed air at the prestigious École des Mines and École Centrale where ‘the 
incontestable superiority of compressed air’ by comparison to, say, steam engines, was 
the subject of theories and experiments concerning the transmission and distribution 
of motive power.42  But there was sufficient room for collaboration too as the 
construction of the tunnel at Mont Cenis demonstrated, bringing together as it did the 




Despite important disadvantages when compared to steam and electricity, namely, 
installation costs, the relatively low productivity, and reduced capacity, compressed air 
became the most convenient technology for specific kinds of works. Using compressed 
air was practical, clean, simple, and easy to maintain.43 At the same time, it seemed as 
if compressed air was a technology used by necessity rather than choice, and in those 
cases and at those sites where the disadvantages of other existing technologies 
became all too apparent. How, then, can we account for their use in cities?  
 
As we will see, compressed air technologies made their entrance to urban contexts 
first as auxiliary technologies to relieve the burden on congested systems that were 
already in place and operational. The association of these technologies with cleanness 
and hygiene – compare air to steam engine or electricity, both of which evoked images 
of fire and smoke (although pneumatic technologies also used steam engines to 
compress air, burning fire was not present in the actual deployment of pneumatic 
tools) – was also part of the broader concern for sanitation in nineteenth- and early-
twentieth century Western cities.44 What made pneumatic technologies particularly 
suitable for urban networks was the ease of transmission of air, which, in the end, 
proved inflexible in urban environments that changed rapidly and in directions that 
were often unintended. 
 
Cities of air 
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In its 1921 issue, the Compressed Air Magazine published a short piece with an 
alarming title: ‘Air alleviates torture in Paris beauty shops’. The author of the piece 
reported on ‘how compressed air is used to lessen the discomforts of ladies 
undergoing the painful process of the “permanent artificial hair wave” at the hands of 
the Parisian beauty experts’: 
 
It is a tropical experience for the patient, for a great deal of heat is generated in 
the spools. The whole apparatus looks like some device of the Spanish 
Inquisition. This is where the compressed air comes in, for an operator stands 
beside the victim and blows a current of air from a rubber hose over the scalp to 
alleviate suffering. Every beauty parlor or barber shop in Paris may have 
compressed air at its command, for it is piped through the streets just as gas and 
water are in other cities.45 
 
For the early advocates of pneumatic technologies one of the keys to unlock the 
potential of compressed air was to develop its production, distribution and 
consumption in a way similar to the provision of public utilities much in the same way 
as the Compressed Air reporter recognised in Paris. By the mid-nineteenth century, a 
strong link had developed between compressed-air technologies and communications 
in cities, more specifically, urban transport and postal services. There was no shortage 
of projects and inventions proposing to connect the pneumatic telegraph to 
atmospheric railways and canals.46 Successful applications of the pneumatic system 
would later include the delivery of parcels and light goods connecting railway termini 
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to central post offices, banks, hotels and large buildings, in a way that was reminiscent 
of Medhurst’s ideas. Compressed air allowed mail deliveries to avoid street 
congestion, making the laying out of pneumatic tubes, and the investment behind it, 
more attractive as it saved time and money. Large compressed air distribution centres 
were operational in cities by the end of the nineteenth century. In the UK, the General 
Compressed Air Company was serving both Birmingham and Leeds in 1885. In 1890, 
Paris was served by the Compagnie Parisienne de l’Air Comprimé with a network of 600 
kilometres.47  
 
But how was air compressed and distributed in cities and how did it compare with its 
direct ‘urban’ competitor, namely, electricity? Two aspects are important in answering 
this question: first, the actual production and distribution of compressed air and its 
relationship to efficiency, productivity, maintenance and safety; and, second, the 
extent to which compressed air served as an auxiliary to existing urban networks. 
 
Pneumatic technologies either compress or depress air with the aim of obtaining a 
difference in pressure within and outside the transmitting tubes, making the pressure 
inside either lower (by sucking the air out of the tube, exhausting air and creating a 
vacuum) or higher (by pumping higher pressure air into the tube) than atmospheric 
pressure. The first is rarefied, the other is compressed air. Both work on the same 
principle: making the air flow as a result of the difference in pressure at the two ends 
of a tube. In terms of production costs, rarefied air was more economical than 
compressed air. However, there are several other reasons that made compressed-air 
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technologies more convenient and economical. First, in the case of a leak in a tube laid 
in wet ground, the exhausted tube draws in water, which is not the case with 
compressed air. Second, air cushions in tubes work more efficiently and effectively 
with compressed air, allowing a better control of the speed of carriers when they 
arrive at their stations. Finally, the sending and receiving apparatus of exhaust systems 
require larger cylinders and pistons compared to those used in compressed air.48  
 
As for its distribution, a contemporary account provides a comparative description of 
the process: Once the air has been compressed 
 
it is simply carried around in pipes, the same as steam or water, but being more 
easily handled than either, for no matter what the length of pipe, there will be 
no condensation as with steam, and no shock as with water. As to the distance 
that air can be carried, that depends entirely on the volume of air and the size of 
pipe, the only loss being reduced pressure at the end of pipe line, caused by 
friction if the pipe is not of sufficient size, but at this reduced pressure the air has 
a larger volume, so that the loss is not as much as the fall in pressure would 
make it appear.49 
 
The inefficiency of using compressed air as a method for transmitting mechanical 
power was due to the energy that was lost during the compression and the relaxation 
of air. However, as Pernolet and others explained, compressed air also provided a 
reserve of potential energy that might be kept indefinitely if the reservoir was tightly 
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closed. Compressed air was ‘elastic and supple’, and by using tubing that was easy and 
economical to install, it could be transmitted over long distances with minimal loss 
along the way. 50  Moreover, cities provided a somewhat ideal context for the 
distribution of 'the motive power among a large number of smaller workshops' whose 
economy of operation compared considerably better than the larger and medium 
steam engines that were in use.51 
 
Productivity, especially when compressed air and electricity were compared, was 
another important aspect of their distribution. Transmission using electricity had a 
productivity (‘rendement’) of up to ninety per cent, whereas compressed air barely 
made it to over twenty per cent. However, machines using electricity were vulnerable 
when sudden fits and starts were involved in the working of tools used, such as tool 
used for fastening nuts or drilling. If the machine met a resistance that was higher than 
normal, either the electric fuses melted down or the motor was damaged. By contrast, 
machines using compressed air simply stopped, and could easily be re-started once the 
resistance was removed. This made the use of electricity inconvenient in tools for 
fastening nuts, hammer drills and, on a larger scale, boring machines. Apart from 
safety considerations, what made compressed air operated machines preferable over 
those using electricity was the simplicity of their construction as well as the ease of 
their installation, use and maintenance.52 
 
The relationship between, on the one hand, efficiency and productivity, and, on the 
other, safety, usage and maintenance, provided a useful contrast of the differences 
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between and the benefits of the two technologies. By the late 1890s, the assessment 
was generally in favour of compressed air:  
 
The difficulties encountered in electrical operations are numerous, and in many 
cases impossible to overcome. Everything must be guarded with the closest 
scrutiny, demanding the highest skilled and educated labour; lighting, moisture, 
etc., are constant causes of trouble; extreme care is required by the operators to 
avoid receiving the dangerous and often fatal current; the machinery runs at 
high speed, requiring buildings and foundations of the most substantial 
construction. 
Compressed air has none of these difficulties to contend with. The compressor is 
but little more than a steam engine with one or more extra cylinders and their 
valves, all of simple design; it runs at safe speeds, is clean, comparatively 
noiseless, and safe in every way, and the same may be said of the compressed air 
machine at the other end of the line, considered in itself.53 
 
Victor Popp, the founder of the first city-wide distributor of compressed air in Paris, 
made similar observations about the advantages of compressed air over electricity. He 
maintained that electric cables were a constant source of worry for operators, and 
electric systems required a specialist crew for maintenance. Ceramic conduits proved 
inadequate and required constant replacement.54 Compressed air, on the other hand, 
was good for its simplicity. It did not require an army of engineers, as electric systems 
did; ‘an ordinary mechanic’ sufficed. Another advantage was ‘direct accumulation’, 
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whereby it was possible to store compressed air in the reservoirs of the factory, in the 
pipes, and in the containers of automobiles.55 As an anonymous author observed: 
 
One of the most important advantages of compressed air is that it lends itself so 
well – incomparably better than any other system – to direct storage, which 
quality admits of holding in reserve great accumulations of energy with so much 
ease and economy. So far as accumulation of reserve power is concerned, 
electricity has incontestably shown itself greatly inferior to compressed air.56 
 
Furthermore, the abrupt interruptions in the electric system caused damage to the 
machines, which was not the case when compressed air was used. Popp also argued 
that, economically, electricity and compressed air were equal. His assessment was 
based on the cost of providing energy for a kilometer of tramway traction, without 
considering the initial installation costs. The Popp-Conti company had invested in the 
compressed air tramway of Saint Quentin, the first of its kind in France. The system 
combined steam engines, boilers and compressors, which together operated a 7-km 
line with eight carriages of forty places each.57 In short, the two qualities that made 
compressed air superior to electricity were, in Popp’s view, practicality and security.58 
 
Compressed air was thus stored, distributed, and mastered better than electricity, 
steam or water. This made pneumatic technologies convenient for use in urban 
networks, partly because of their association with security and hygiene; partly, 
because of the positive relationship between the availability of space and the size of 
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the installations needed to compressed the air and distribute it: relatively small 
installations servicing areas where land was sparse. The other important aspect was 
the application of pneumatic technologies as an auxiliary to relieve the pressure on 
already existing urban networks, especially in those cases where it could also save time 
and money.  
 
The pneumatic postal system started at about the same time in several capital cities of 
Europe from the 1850s onwards, London leading the way, followed by Paris, Berlin, 
Vienna, Prague and towards the end of the nineteenth century and early twentieth 
century on the other side of the Atlantic, in Philadelphia, Boston, New York, Chicago 
and Saint Louis. The reason for recourse to this technology was the burden on 
telegraphy networks. ‘*T+he telegraph networks of the 1850s’, Standage writes, ‘were 
subject to congestion as the volume of traffic mushroomed, and key network links 
within major cities became overloaded’. The use of vehicles for transmitting telegraph 
messages caused delays because of traffic congestion, and the use of messenger boys, 
as it was done in London, did not inspire public confidence in the system. The Electric 
Telegraph Company in London was the first to use a pneumatic system to transmit 
telegraph messages between different offices, which then installed similar systems in 
Liverpool, Birmingham and Manchester.59 The business opportunity seemed lucrative, 
and the London Pneumatic Dispatch Company was created in 1859 for the pneumatic 
transmission of mail, parcels and light goods.60 
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The first section of the London Pneumatic Dispatch Company was opened in 1863 
covering the distance between the Eversholt post office near Euston Station to the 
headquarters of the General Post Office (GPO) at St. Martin’s-le-Grand. It ran from 
Eversholt street to Drummond street, continuing down Hampstead Road and then 
Tottenham Court Road all the way to New Oxford Street, from there turning east 
under Holborn Street, passing below Farringdon Street to reach Newgate, and finally 
to its home at the GPO headquarters near Cheapside at St. Martin’s-le-Grand. 
 
The tube was four feet high and four and half feet wide, and it served to transport 
both mails and parcels between the two offices using pneumatic pressure. The central 
station was located in High Holborn, where the motive power was centralised and 
contained. The air was sucked out from in front of the cars carrying the parcels. The 
cars carrying the parcels were drawn by suction (the air was sucked out from in front 
of them), reaching speeds as high as thirty-five miles per hour. The journey from one 
end to the other took nine minutes. According to the account of an engineer who 
worked for the Company from 1869, the carrier cars reached speeds of sixty miles an 
hour, and it was not unusual for them to shoot people through the tube; he himself 
had made the journey, which was exhilarating, especially on the hottest of summer 
days, ‘the air being fresh and cool’ inside the tube.61 
 
When the line was first opened, it was greeted with enthusiasm: ‘Between the 
pneumatic dispatch and the subterranean railway’, that is the first section of the 
Metropolitan Railway, which opened in January the same year, 1863, ‘the days ought 
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to be fast approaching when the ponderous goods vans which now ply between 
station and station shall disappear for ever from the streets of London’.62 The prospect 
was both good and lucrative. 
 
However, leaks were a constant problem: ‘The insuperable difficulty lay apparently in 
the impossibility of rendering the tunnel sufficiently air-tight. Leakages of various 
extents prohibited the creating of a working vacuum’.63 The Company went into 
liquidation in 1875, and the line forgotten until George Threlfall, a consulting engineer, 
came upon it by chance in 1895. According to his estimations, after a fair amount of 
investment, the disused tube could be put to working order for hosting cars propelled 
by electricity. The commercial value of the tube lay in the fact that ‘*p+ractically all the 
heavy post to the north of Great Britain passe*d+ through the Euston Station’ and the 
use of vans for transporting post was both time consuming and inconvenient (heavy 
traffic), taking twenty-four minutes at the best of times, or double that time depending 
on traffic and the weather. The prospects of turning it to a profitable utility were good 
for it was ‘a gold mine extending from the G.P.O. at St. Martin’s-le-Grand to Euston 
station’. Goldmine or not, the system was unused by 1900 when a different observer 
asked: ‘Is there any other city in the wide world where a cast iron tunnel, two and 
three-quarter miles in length, could lie disused, unknown, lost to the memory of all but 
a few scientists, for over thirty years, excepting London?’64 ‘That a privately owned 
tube should be forgotten is not remarkable’, would be the (indirect) response of The 
Times nearly four decades later, conceding that ‘it *was+ a strange indication of the 
short memories of Londoners’.65 
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Across the Channel, Paris also introduced a pneumatic network for the delivery of 
messages, ‘Le pneu’, whose service started in 1867 for the transport of urgent letters. 
As in London, it was originally conceived as an auxiliary to the over-burdened electrical 
telegraph system. Unlike London, however, it was a state-owned network, it worked 
with compressed air and was hugely successful, developing into a vast network that 
remained operational until 1984. The Paris system benefited greatly from the already 
laid out infrastructure – Haussmann’s vaulted sewers, where the tubes could be placed 
– and it was more compact compared to London, which was an advantage for this 
network. Furthermore, ‘le petit-bleu’ – the folded blue stationary for the messages 
sent by this system – quickly entered the imaginary Parisians, giving rise to expressions 
such as ‘attraper un bleu’ (receiving a message via pneumatic post).66 
 
The decisive moment for installing the Parisian network came when the telegraph lines 
became too busy and there was a shortage of personnel during peak hours. A first 
response to this congestion was the putting in place of horse-pulled cars that operated 
every fifteen minutes between the post office at Grenelle (where the ministries were 
located) and the Bourse (a distance of three kilometres covered in about fifteen 
minutes). The test line of the pneumatic network was installed in 1866 between the 
Bourse office and a branch office at the Grand Hôtel (Boulevard des Capucines). When 
this proved satisfactory, a tube was laid to connect the two main telegraph offices, one 
at the Bourse, the other at Grenelle, which eventually led to the creation of a city-wide 
network starting with the laying down of tubes in the sewers from 1868.  
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The transported objects were placed in cartridges. Each office had a sending and 
receiving apparatus. Each cartridge contained approximately thirty-five letters. The 
system was both rapid and effective. It delivered the letters faster than the horse-
pulled cars, and its output was higher compared to the telegraph over the same 
distance. The network used two already existing urban systems. One of these was the 
sewers, which made the initial installation relatively easy and cheap. The second was 
the already operating system of post offices, which were now linked with a pneumatic 
network. The network, though efficient, required a high number of personnel for 
surveillance, maintenance and repairs.67 
 
Insert Fig. 5 here 
 
Soon proposals were put forward to use compressed air for transcontinental 
communication. Among them was J. B. Berlier’s The Pneumatic Transmission of 
Messages and Parcels between Paris and London, via Calais and Dover (1885). Berlier's 
scheme consisted in laying 'two pneumatic tubes [...] between Paris and London, 
which would serve for the transmission of letters, telegrams and parcels, weighting 
not more than 5 kilogrammes, or 11lbs.' The total distance was 475 kilometres and 
followed the existing railway lines. According to Belier's estimates, parcels, letters and 
telegrams would be delivered by six trains an hour in either direction, each covering 
the entire distance in one hour. The capital required was around £1,360,000, with an 
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expected annual dividend of 4.90 per cent, based on 300 working days per year.68  
Whether appealing or not, the scheme did not take off. 
 
The advantages that compressed air represented for postal services made the system 
relatively popular. ‘In 1872 *the US+ Congress appropriated $15,000 for a pneumatic 
dispatch tube between the Capitol and the Government Printing Office in 
Washington.'69 There were pneumatic postal services in Vienna since 1875 and Prague 
since 1899. 70  By the late 1890s, other pneumatic postal services included the 
Batcheller system in New York and the Bostedo Package and Cash Carrier Company in 
Chicago.71 
 
Implementation was also subject to the politics of the technologies used. The first 
experimental service tried in Berlin in 1865 concerned two different administrations, 
the Royal Prussian Telegraph and the Post Office. Differences were solved in 1876, 
after the death of von Chauvin, director of Telegraphs, when the renamed Rohrpost 
was extended to twenty-six kilometres. The Rohrpost had thirty-eight stations by May 
1888, ninety-four in 1936, remaining operational until 1963 when it was closed.72 
 
By 1900, a committee reporting on proposals for pneumatic tubes for mail in twenty-
seven cities in the USA suggested that compressed air served a very specific purpose, 
namely, first-class mail, and only in those cases where there was a market for this 
service could the costs of infrastructure be justified. Out of the eleven cities the 
committee reported on only in New York, Philadelphia, Boston, Chicago, and St Louis 
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was the system deemed justifiable when the costs and expected revenue were 
compared. The committee also advised proponents to incorporate ‘moderate charges 
for operation and equally reasonable cost of construction’ into their bids in order to 
avoid the inflated estimates of initial costs.73  
 
Specialisation, as exemplified by the use of compressed air in first-class post, was also 
apparent through the introduction of red mailboxes (Rohrpost) specifically for 
pneumatic postcards, which were introduced in 1879 in Vienna in an attempt to boost 
low usage: two items per station –total of ten- per day during the first year of 
operation. Similar was the special stationery including letter sheets, envelopes, post 
cards and letter cards, which were made to special sizes so that they fitted the tubes 
without exceeding the weight limit of ten grams. By 1913, there were over fifty post 
offices connected across Vienna’s pneumatic system, which remained in operation 
until 1956.74 
 
Given its relatively widespread use, the pneumatic postal system would become iconic 
of a service that brought air, not light, to cities. After several decades of operation, the 
Paris network continued to impress visitors who contributed to the myth of the French 
capital being ‘a city of air’ through their reports: 
 
Paris is rightfully boastful of her air – her sparkling, refreshing air. But below 
ground, she is also a city of air – compressed air, ready to do man’s bidding. In 
short, Paris is the only place in the world where compressed air is a public utility 
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like gas, electricity, and steam: where compressed air is carried from one end of 
the metropolis to the other in a vast network of piping, beneath the city streets, 
to do a multiplicity of services.75 
 
Insert Fig. 6 here 
 
Diversifying supplemented specialisation as the Parisian experience demonstrated. By 
1894, the Compagnie Parisienne de l’Air Comprimé had two factories for compressing 
air, one at rue Saint-Fargeau and the other at the quai de la Gare, totalling 13,000-
horsepower; a compressed air tube network of 168,500 metres underground, of which 
66,500 was for distributing time and 102,000 for distributing motor power; 7,400 
pneumatic clocks or dials; and sixteen cold rooms under the ground at the Bourse du 
Commerce. As the Company’s founder put it: 
 
The compressed air tubes arrive in homes exactly as gas pipes do, and it is a 
simple pipe with an ordinary tap, which delivers motor force constantly to the 
consumer in the form of compressed air, that is, in a handy, clean, absolutely 
harmless, and even healthy form, that is immediately usable in a multiplicity of 
ways, which also has, furthermore the advantage of being cheap.76 
 
Insert Figs 7 and 8 here 
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This meant that Parisians used compressed air in at least three respects: as a motor 
force (from moving hands on clock dials to sewing machines and heavy machinery); for 
ventilation (for both industrial and residential premises); and for refrigeration (cold 
room for storing meat and other perishables).  
 
Compressed air was also central to engineering projects such as the Nord-Sud line, 
built in the mid 1900s in Paris as a complement to the Métropolitain, and the 
completion of the tunnel across the Hudson River in New York, despite setbacks and 
the ‘nonchalance’ and obstinacy of Colonel Haskin and others. 77  Unsurprisingly, 
companies often sought to expand their markets by devising new applications for the 
technologies they used. This was true of Popp’s company, but also of several others, 
including the Compagnie Parisienne du Gaz, which in 1896, experimented for the first 
time in France with a ‘vehicle by mechanic traction’ of the kind tried already in 
Blackpool in the UK, Criesfield in the USA and other places in Germany.78  
 
The very mechanical effects of compressed air would even give the owners of cafes 
along the grand boulevards of Paris the support they needed in order to run their 
businesses more effectively and economically, at a time when electric networks were 
neither extensive nor reliable. Café owners had compressed air motors in their 
basements for the dynamos, producing four to ten horsepower. They soon realised 
that the air released from the machines could be used to keep beverages cold.  
However, the expansion of the air, while cooling the surrounding temperature, also 
froze up any moisture that remained in the air. Since the compressors used water as 
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an intermediary, they produced vapour which then used to condense in the tubes and 
the connected machines, also freezing up the exhaust.79 When compressed air is 
released, it absorbs heat from surrounding objects during its ‘relaxation’ or expansion, 
which is why it was also used for refrigeration.80 The real boom in the use of 
compressed air technologies came after 1884 with the construction of machines that 
could compress ‘à sec’. According to Champly, it was ‘la compression à sec’ that 
allowed the distribution of compressed air in cities’.81 Why, then, did this technology 




Paris, after all, became not the ‘city of air’, but of light. She was both, of course; the 
two technologies were not mutually exclusive. But the significance of air being 
compressed, distributed and consumed in Paris, and in the several other cities we 
have discussed, has been overshadowed by our enchantment with light. 82 
Pneumatic technologies have been marginal to our understanding of the 
transformation of western cities in the late nineteenth and early twentieth 
centuries. The acceleration of change, ‘new engineering knowledge’, and ‘capital 
availability’ that might have given rise to the building of infrastructure in North 
American and European cities during this period does not take into account 
developments in compressed air.83 Yet, cities of light were also cities where air was 
compressed, distributed and consumed in a variety of ways, using existing 
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networks, but also building new ones, contributing to the specialisation and 
spatialisation of uses that different technologies exemplified.  
 
Similarly, our fascination with electricity has led to trends in historiography that 
take little account of the work of figures such as George Medhurst and others.84 
Medhurst’s ideas about the transport of people, letters, goods and parcels, 
provided the conceptual basis for future developments in urban transport in 
London and, by extension, in several other cities. Pneumatics, not electricity, paved 
the way for future advances in urban transport and urban infrastructure. The 
comparative differences that made compressed air the technology of choice for the 
wide range of uses that have been discussed in this article were the result of 
contrasting two inter-related elements emerging during the process: the urban 
development of other technologies, notably steam and electricity, and the 
possibilities provided by the available spaces where air could be compressed and by 
other infrastructural networks that allowed the compressed air to be distributed. At 
the same time, the intensification of communications was greatest in cities. Higher 
frequencies, larger, heavier, lighter or smaller loads traveling longer distances, and 
speedier deliveries were conditions that cities imposed on services such as urban 
transport and the post. The question was how to turn these services into public 
utilities. One alternative that advocates of compressed air found was for the 
technology to function as an auxiliary to networks that were pressed or had 
reached their limits, notably the telegraph and the post.  
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But providing merely an auxiliary function to overburdened networks using other 
technologies was not adequate for the survival of pneumatic technologies in urban 
networks. Nor was is adequate to elevate such technologies to glorious symbols of 
urban modernity. The development of pneumatic networks were intimately bound 
up with urban development, but they were, in the end, unable to match the 
dynamism and pace of urban expansion. Even in Paris, which was the ‘showcase’ of 
pneumatic technologies, compressed air networks could not compete with other 
technologies. One of the reasons why pneumatic technologies developed in Paris 
was that the city was rich in construction sites that required machinery using 
compressed air because of large-scale public works. In the last two decades of the 
nineteenth-century, the Paris underground was home to up to five different 
pneumatic networks, including time distribution, postal service, draining, and motor 
force, using either compressed air or rarefied air.85 
 
However, one of the main disadvantages of pneumatic networks was (and still is) that, 
whatever the function of the network, its size is limited because of the nature of this 
technology. To have sufficient force in the networks inhibits the use of large pipes and 
the spread of the network over long distances. Furthermore, the pipes tend to reduce 
in diameter as the distance grows to keep the force constant. This makes the extension 
of the system by branching out difficult, indeed impossible, unless several power 
stations are constructed along the network, which, in turn, is costly. As Poujol argues, 
pneumatic networks in constantly changing or expanding urban systems are not easy 
or feasible. This was one of the advantages of electrical networks: it was possible to 
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make interconnections over long distances in a way that pneumatic networks did not 
allow. Extension is difficult or indeed impossible in pneumatic networks after a certain 
point. The technical aspects represent important advantages, but it is their limited 
field of action that poses problems.86 By the early 1890s, current transmission over 
distance between cities had became feasible, something pneumatics could not do. 
 
Pneumatic technologies also take up bigger spaces, which is a problem in dynamic 
and popular cities where land values are high – London, for example. Networks 
combine three features: generation, storage and transmission. 87  Pneumatic 
networks were not terribly efficient in the latter, which meant that they could not 
be too far away from the urban centres they were serving for the former two. Given 
the inefficiency of long distance transmission of compressed air, production and 
storage facilities had to be nearby. As noted above, the production and storage of 
compressed air required the construction of large buildings to house large 
machinery, which took up vast spaces and was was prohibitive in cities with high 
property values. 
 
We agree with Atmore that the ‘failure’ of compressed air technologies – in his case, 
the failed attempt to introduce atmospheric railway traction in the UK in the 1840s – 
cannot be attributed merely to technical problems. It is equally important to take into 
consideration how people think about those technologies, what place they have in 
imaginaries. In Atmore’s case, he attributes the failure to introduce pneumatic 
railways in the UK in the 1840 not merely to ‘mechanical obduracy’, but to the collapse 
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of the railway mania following – the ‘railway bubble’ burst in 1845 – in the same 
period, which made experimenting with new technologies more risky and less 
desirable. Moreover, the steam locomotive was deeply ‘entrenched in the Victorians’ 
perceptions of themselves’.88 
 
The mechanical difficulties facing pneumatic technologies in cities were not, to a 
certain degree at least, insurmountable. These were, like electricity, network-creating 
technologies, and it is here that the main difficulties facing the urban applications of 
these technologies lay – not because the applications were mechanically poor, but 
because the network was not as flexible as it should be in rapidly changing context. 
The production and storage facilities required space at a time when urban space was 
becoming more valuable. Furthermore, the setting up of the network was not only 
costly but disruptive in already congested cities. Paris was at an advantage, because 
the infrastructure was already laid out by the sewer system. In London, on the other 
hand, just laying the pipes was a problem. As the Parliamentary debates show, when 
the idea of ‘reviving’ the Pneumatic Despatch Company came in the early twentieth 
century, there was great concern about ‘the grave evils arising from the construction 
and maintenance of a new and extensive system of underground tubes’, as the 
Postmaster General Lord Stanley put it. There was also concern, in London as well as in 
Paris, of granting access to the underground to private companies.89 
 
Paris, compared to other cities where pneumatic technologies were employed, had the 
advantage of being compact and having an infrastructure to house the pneumatic 
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pipes. But, as the city grew and changed, questions of scale and flexibility arose, to 
which pneumatic technologies could not provide a satisfactory answer. The 
characteristic growth of late-nineteenth- and early-twentieth-century cities became 
the force that pierced the pipes through which the dreams of compressed air travelled. 
There was also concern, as noted, about opening the underground to private 
companies. In the nineteenth century, it was still possible to consider alternatives to 
electricity, and pneumatics was a contender. However, by mid-twentieth century, 
what the pneumatics were doing but electricity could not was either no longer 
necessary in most urban contexts (such as post service in the US cities) or were not 
necessarily glorious symbols of urban modernity (digging roads, for example). 
Furthermore, pneumatics never had the place of pride in urban imaginaries. While 
they did useful work in cities, they mainly remained in obscurity, and lacked the 
versatility, flexibility and visibility of electricity. It is, after all, possible to imagine fin de 
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